In the last chapter of the book, the author seems looking for the solution for his doubts in the public health issues he raised in the prior chapters. For the regulatory system in the United States, “the anarchic and overlapping division of responsibilities between the agencies” is considered the source of the chaos. He make the analogy between the 90’s Arthur Andersen scandal and the current science world; promote that there should be a Sarbanes-Oxley for Science to reform the federal legislation system in public health issues. To strength his opinion, he provides twelve recommendations. I would like to review all of his recommendations and raise some questions to these recommendations as following:
1. “Require Full Disclosure of Any and All Sponsor Involvement in Scientific Studies”
Considering the tendency of science link to the commerce, the author realize the situation that corporations block the publication of research and sponsors control the results of studies should be regulated. This recommendation has the similar purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley that provides a more transparent science world and independent research to increase the reliability of science research and publication.
Question:
a. As the author’s consideration, corporate money and grant are great parts of most scientific research funding, although some published journals have already promoted the ideas, if all the sponsors evacuate due to no interest and benefit from those research, is it a way to restrict the development of our science?
2. “Manufacturers Must Test Chemicals before Exposing Workers and the Public”
As the cases of environmental hazard reported before, most of them are found from the mode of “body in the morgue” method. However, the high risk expose environment is not that difficult to found. To improve the work-place environment, it might increase the cost of manufacturers, that might be the reasons most industries and manufacturers would rather they don’t know. The author consider EPA should have the right to require manufacturers conduct basic toxicity testing before the environment expose to workers and public.
Question:
a. As the description of the book, after the disclosure of high risk or toxic effect to workers and public, the manufacturers tend to solve problems by complain, ask for support from senators, and etc., when everything does not work, manufacturers still need to change after all. The money they spend on the others support which will not improve the actual situation will be great, why they do not consider maintain the environmental health at the first beginning?
3. “Manufacturers Must Disclose What They Know about the Toxicity of Their Products”
Even TSCA legislation has the requirement that all companies need to inform the EPA every adverse effect they found in the chemical exposure, the executive which conducted by some agencies cannot run this rule strictly. The “confidential business information” (CBI) becomes an umbrella for hiding adverse research result. The author suggests enabling legislation to regulate the report policies.
Question:
a. As the doubt to Sarbanes-Oxley Act, limiting the accounting and business confidential make the trade market more transparent, however, the complain about the Act restrict competition among companies never stop. How can we get the balance to maintain the confidential and competition when we promote the new Act?
b. I think most of manufacturers will tend to pursue benefit without bring harm to public. In the standpoint of the manufacturers, if they have the adverse result in the new product which they invest a great fund, who can afford the risk of fail?
4. “Put an End to Rigged Data Reanalysis”
As this recommendation, the private data reanalysis which is conducted by stakeholders or corporation related to the hazards should stop. Since the variability of epidemiology data analysis, any slight change of the indicator or methodology will change the analysis result dramatically, it is important for some quality data reanalysis in science, however, if the reanalysis is conducted by benefit related corporation, it might cause the confusion for public agencies and legislator’s judge.
Question:
a. Every manufactures will try their best to protect their benefit, when they raise a doubt about the public research result, how can the public agencies comfort this complain and doubt if only restrict the private data reanalysis?
5. “Hold Real People Accountable”
Providing a similar standard as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the author consider require the full disclosure of all administration board members and defined their specific responsibility in science research and legislator process can put an end to the intent ignorance of adverse results of science.
6. “Require Equal Treatment for Public and Private Science”
The unequal treatment between public and private studies is considered as the source of rigged data reanalysis and paralyzing the legislation process. For the public research, the laws require the agencies to consider the responsibility of making any comment and questions. However, the private studies which can get more resources will receive less restriction. The author suggests this model should be opposite advocate.
Question:
a. The public research face to more restriction and less funding sources, as the example of Marie and Pierre Curie and Wilhelm Roentgen (who discovered the x-rays), I feel great respect to their selfless contribution to human-being. However if science is only maintained by moral and consciousness, how can it survival for a long run?
7. “Protect the Independence of Federal Scientists and the Science Advisory Committees”
The financial ties to the scientists influence their judgments to those cord decision related to the benefit of manufacturers. Interest conflict also decrease the motivation of those top scientists involved into the independence and public research. The author suggested the federal agencies should reform that scientists who have financial conflict can only contribute ideas to conflict issues but no right to vote for the decision.
Question:
a. As I heard from the other respond, scientists who work in universities will tend to have a lower salary compare to the ones work in corporation or companies, I think this unequal treatment will cause more and more excellent experts leave the pure academic research and get involve into the sponsors’ conducted research. What do you think the further impact of this situation?
8. “Increase Public Disclosure of Hazards”
Shaming is a great regulation, as the term given by Mary Graham from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. The less public disclosure of hazards, the less manufactures would have motivation to change. The author suggests increasing public disclosure of hazards will be benefit for our society to inspect some corporations’ behavior.
Question:
a. As we all known, media which is a business will surely receive a great sponsor from different corporations, what can be the motivation for those media to disclosure a hazard related to their sponsors?
9. “Require Corporations to Make a Plan and Stick to It”
The author suggests each business should public their own plan to all employees and community to accept the inspection from public. It can decrease the diversity standard in timely agencies and the companies. At the same time, it can decrease the inspection process and make it more effective.
Question:
a. Who should be responsible to make this plan? If the employees and public haven’t realized a new hazards, how can we ensure the plan will work based on the benefit of workers and community?
10. “ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable)”
Since the diversity of risk exposure level in different chemical material, so many chemical material do not have a standard for safe exposure level, the author suggests we should promote the “ALARA” which has already provide to radiation experts in all the other substances.
Question:
a. I think the vaguer of the standard, the more difficult for the public health agencies to provide inspection in our world. “ALARA” have a great purpose when it is founded, however, how can we provide it to all the other substances and maintain a well control of low risk exposure in work-place?
11. “Integrate the Control of Environmental and Workplace Toxic Exposures”
Although there are several different public health agencies tend to facilitate the inspection process and environmental health control, lack of consistent philosophy and repeat procedures will decrease the efficacy of the executive system. “Take Down the Stovepipes” might be a fast way to improve this situation.
Question:
a. I haven’t fully understand the administration and executive system in the United States, I think to decide which agency should be survival after the author’s proposal might be the next issue here. I wondering if there is somewhat centralization administration providing to this arrangement, was it more helpful for the system reform?
12. “Make the States Public Health Protection ‘Laboratories’”
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Chapter 16 Making Peace with the Past
Before the WWII, there were not many opportunities for jobs to come by, until the WWII era of the invention of America's vast nuclear weapon produced several working opportunities. Constructing these nuclear weapons jobs, by production facilities, laboratories, and nuclear test sites throughout New Mexico, Tennessee, Washington State and eventually scattered through the United States, conversely resulted in environmental degradation and adverse health effects among the nuclear weapon workers. These nuclear weapon workers were exposed to some of the deadliest substance ever used which resulted in cancer and diseases. The capital investment in the weapons exceeded the combined capital investment of DuPont, General Motors, U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Alcoa, and Goodyear (p. 214). It was not until thirty years later, in the 1980's and 1990's when accounts of the mismanagement of the weapons complex the surface.
In David Michael's book, Doubt is Their Product, chapter sixteen discusses the side effects from the weapons project after WWII, and explains the law he helped create in order to reduce decades of inadequate protection for nuclear weapon workers. Before then, many of the workers in the weapons project were not aware how much of influence their work environment conflicted with their health, and if they did they battled to fight for their protection of their health rights. "many of the workers were told the names or the hazardous nature of the other material with which they worked, and if they were told, they were prohibited from sharing this information with their spouses and physicians. (To this day, many workers are still not old this information.) If they subsequently became ill, that was just too bad" (p. 217).
In 1988, the Radiation-exposed Veterans Compensation Act, provided benefits for people who contracted cancer and a number of other specified diseases as a direct result of their exposure from the environment, intentionally and unintentionally. However, it was debatable to argue the fairness of compensation for the atomic veterans. "Cancer caused by radiation looks the same cancer caused otherwise. Doctors' cannot tell the difference" (p. 218). Department of Energy, (was known as Atomic Energy Commission) had faced serious problem with its "deny and defend" policy when confronting nuclear weapons works who said their job had made them sick. The National Cancer Institute develop a system to calculate the "probability of causation" from other cancer that may have had additional causes to help defined the atomic veterans. Even those obvious sick workers, were not getting compensation for occupational illness because most workers in the weapons complex were considered private sector workers given that they were employed by the contractor the government had hired to run the facility.
Followed by 1990, Congress passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), a federal statute providing for the monetary compensation of people who contracted cancer and number of other specified diseases, or the widows of uranium miners who had died. Since most were employed by the private constructors it was required in most states for employers to carry workers' compensation insurance to cover medical expenses, wage-loss payments, and rehabilitation's and death benefits (p. 222). Unfortunately, in 2000 RECA ran out of money and those widows received an IOU letter from the U.S. government.
It was until victory for the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA), was enacted to provide compensation and medical benefits to the workers of the nuclear weapon complex. In 2004, Congress finally passed the legislation, ensuring the Department of Labor would fully pay out sick workers and surviving wives of uranium miners would not ever receive an IOU from the government if their program ran out of funds again (p. 231).
QUESTIONS:
Why do you believe the AEC and Doe hounded and questioned Dr. Mancuso on his researched results of detecting increased cancer among workers at the plutonium production facility in Handford, Washington (p. 218)?
Quoted from Michael, "The Department of Justice had always been successful in shielding the government from liability in these claims" (p. 229). Why do you consider the Department of Justice was successful for protecting this from the government?
Why couldn't the atomic veterans get support that their cancer was caused by radiation in order to get fair compensation?
Personally, how would you feel if you were a widow of uranium miner and you received an IOU from the U.S. government?
In David Michael's book, Doubt is Their Product, chapter sixteen discusses the side effects from the weapons project after WWII, and explains the law he helped create in order to reduce decades of inadequate protection for nuclear weapon workers. Before then, many of the workers in the weapons project were not aware how much of influence their work environment conflicted with their health, and if they did they battled to fight for their protection of their health rights. "many of the workers were told the names or the hazardous nature of the other material with which they worked, and if they were told, they were prohibited from sharing this information with their spouses and physicians. (To this day, many workers are still not old this information.) If they subsequently became ill, that was just too bad" (p. 217).
In 1988, the Radiation-exposed Veterans Compensation Act, provided benefits for people who contracted cancer and a number of other specified diseases as a direct result of their exposure from the environment, intentionally and unintentionally. However, it was debatable to argue the fairness of compensation for the atomic veterans. "Cancer caused by radiation looks the same cancer caused otherwise. Doctors' cannot tell the difference" (p. 218). Department of Energy, (was known as Atomic Energy Commission) had faced serious problem with its "deny and defend" policy when confronting nuclear weapons works who said their job had made them sick. The National Cancer Institute develop a system to calculate the "probability of causation" from other cancer that may have had additional causes to help defined the atomic veterans. Even those obvious sick workers, were not getting compensation for occupational illness because most workers in the weapons complex were considered private sector workers given that they were employed by the contractor the government had hired to run the facility.
Followed by 1990, Congress passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), a federal statute providing for the monetary compensation of people who contracted cancer and number of other specified diseases, or the widows of uranium miners who had died. Since most were employed by the private constructors it was required in most states for employers to carry workers' compensation insurance to cover medical expenses, wage-loss payments, and rehabilitation's and death benefits (p. 222). Unfortunately, in 2000 RECA ran out of money and those widows received an IOU letter from the U.S. government.
It was until victory for the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA), was enacted to provide compensation and medical benefits to the workers of the nuclear weapon complex. In 2004, Congress finally passed the legislation, ensuring the Department of Labor would fully pay out sick workers and surviving wives of uranium miners would not ever receive an IOU from the government if their program ran out of funds again (p. 231).
QUESTIONS:
Why do you believe the AEC and Doe hounded and questioned Dr. Mancuso on his researched results of detecting increased cancer among workers at the plutonium production facility in Handford, Washington (p. 218)?
Quoted from Michael, "The Department of Justice had always been successful in shielding the government from liability in these claims" (p. 229). Why do you consider the Department of Justice was successful for protecting this from the government?
Why couldn't the atomic veterans get support that their cancer was caused by radiation in order to get fair compensation?
Personally, how would you feel if you were a widow of uranium miner and you received an IOU from the U.S. government?
Monday, February 22, 2010
Chapter 3: America Demands Protection
In Chapter 3: "America Demands Protection" of David Michaels "Doubt is Their Product" the topic of the environmental movement and how pesticides and other chemicals affected and continue to affect our environment is discussed.
In the world we live in today, the environment is a very hot topic, no pun intended. With global warming on the rise, as well as the "Going Green" movement many of the issues that were brought up in the 1960's and 1970's are reoccurring.
A key player in the birth of the environmental movement is said to be Rachel Carson who authored, Silent Spring in 1962. This book outlined the deadly effects of the pesticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane or DDT as it is commonly referred to as.
In June of 1969, when the Cuyahoga River outside of Cleveland, OH caught fire, government was left to do nothing else. President Nixon enacted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and supported the creation of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). DDT was later banned in 1972 by the EPA in regard to the Clean Air Act. The 1970's were beginning to look up, with the environmental movement charging ahead.
However, OSHA began to realize that enforcement of regulations was quite difficult. Thousands of toxic chemicals were being using by industry and to regulate all of them or to be sure industry was abiding by the regulations was near impossible. "Right now (2008) OSHA has enough inspectors to visit every workplace under its jurisdiction every 133 years". This is just plain ridiculous. Especially when the U.S. government was asking them to demonstrate a significant risk with each chemical and then set regulation based off of that risk, known as the "benzene decision". Wouldn't it be easier for industry to inform OSHA what was a safe level and then go from there? One would think, but there are a few issues with that (a) There is a good chance industry would suggest regulations for chemicals that would benefit them and not necessarily their employees and (b) "Industry has no legal obligation to inform employees" in the first place. There lays a whole other problem. Honestly, I think the U.S. government was clearly giving our friends at OSHA unrealistic expectations to complete.
Another industry player during this time was those involved with the plastic industry, or vinyl chloride. This was the new wave of the future, dangerous or not. This story progresses much like others we've talked about this far. Industry develops a product or chemical, tests it, finds it to be harmful to human health by means of industry-paid research, and decides to censor the information and "sits on it". Meanwhile employee health deteriorates and industry is left masking the truth to save their company. Same old story.
A few questions I'd like to pose based off this chapter:
1. Toward the end of the chapter, Michaels talks about how there is a dilemma for industry in the event of a hazardous product or chemical being used by their employees: thousands of jobs being lost due to potential regulation or no longer producing the product, or the health of the employees being affected. Do you feel this is a valid claim? Economy vs. health? What are the two sides to the claim?
2. When testing vinyl chloride for hazardous effects in regard to acroosteolysis or even cancer, the Europeans found some concrete evidence to the later. Why would they insist that the U.S. sign an agreement to not release any information without their consent? Do they feel the U.S. industry may not release the entire truth or is there something else behind that?
3. Finally, what are your feelings on OSHA's task to regulate and enforce limits on all toxic chemicals and that the U.S. government wanted proof of a significant risk before posing a standard? Is this too much demand of a small organization that can visit every site only once every 133 years?!? Who really should be helping to set and enforce these regulations?
(You don't have to answer all questions in your blog, just food for thought).
In the world we live in today, the environment is a very hot topic, no pun intended. With global warming on the rise, as well as the "Going Green" movement many of the issues that were brought up in the 1960's and 1970's are reoccurring.
A key player in the birth of the environmental movement is said to be Rachel Carson who authored, Silent Spring in 1962. This book outlined the deadly effects of the pesticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane or DDT as it is commonly referred to as.
In June of 1969, when the Cuyahoga River outside of Cleveland, OH caught fire, government was left to do nothing else. President Nixon enacted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and supported the creation of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). DDT was later banned in 1972 by the EPA in regard to the Clean Air Act. The 1970's were beginning to look up, with the environmental movement charging ahead.
However, OSHA began to realize that enforcement of regulations was quite difficult. Thousands of toxic chemicals were being using by industry and to regulate all of them or to be sure industry was abiding by the regulations was near impossible. "Right now (2008) OSHA has enough inspectors to visit every workplace under its jurisdiction every 133 years". This is just plain ridiculous. Especially when the U.S. government was asking them to demonstrate a significant risk with each chemical and then set regulation based off of that risk, known as the "benzene decision". Wouldn't it be easier for industry to inform OSHA what was a safe level and then go from there? One would think, but there are a few issues with that (a) There is a good chance industry would suggest regulations for chemicals that would benefit them and not necessarily their employees and (b) "Industry has no legal obligation to inform employees" in the first place. There lays a whole other problem. Honestly, I think the U.S. government was clearly giving our friends at OSHA unrealistic expectations to complete.
Another industry player during this time was those involved with the plastic industry, or vinyl chloride. This was the new wave of the future, dangerous or not. This story progresses much like others we've talked about this far. Industry develops a product or chemical, tests it, finds it to be harmful to human health by means of industry-paid research, and decides to censor the information and "sits on it". Meanwhile employee health deteriorates and industry is left masking the truth to save their company. Same old story.
A few questions I'd like to pose based off this chapter:
1. Toward the end of the chapter, Michaels talks about how there is a dilemma for industry in the event of a hazardous product or chemical being used by their employees: thousands of jobs being lost due to potential regulation or no longer producing the product, or the health of the employees being affected. Do you feel this is a valid claim? Economy vs. health? What are the two sides to the claim?
2. When testing vinyl chloride for hazardous effects in regard to acroosteolysis or even cancer, the Europeans found some concrete evidence to the later. Why would they insist that the U.S. sign an agreement to not release any information without their consent? Do they feel the U.S. industry may not release the entire truth or is there something else behind that?
3. Finally, what are your feelings on OSHA's task to regulate and enforce limits on all toxic chemicals and that the U.S. government wanted proof of a significant risk before posing a standard? Is this too much demand of a small organization that can visit every site only once every 133 years?!? Who really should be helping to set and enforce these regulations?
(You don't have to answer all questions in your blog, just food for thought).
Saturday, February 20, 2010
Chapter 12: The country has a Drug Problem
In this chapter of Doubt is Their Product, David Michaels unveils some of the pharmaceutical companies less than ethical maneuvers and leaves the reader questioning the safety of over the counter and prescription medications and the efficacy of our regulating body, the FDA.
Unlike other topics Michaels chose to discuss in his book, exposure to potential risks related to prescription and over the counter drugs occurs to persons through voluntary use.
Most persons taking medications are acting on the good faith or trust they have in the medical community who prescribe them and the pharmacists who sell them. In turn, the medical community and pharmacists place their trust in the FDA who regulate the drug and doses. The regulation of the drug through the FDA relies of the clinical trials and evidence produced by the maker of the drug itself most of the time. One can see the importance then of looking into just how trustworthy our current system of research and testing is as it relates to our drugs.
Eroding this trust, Michaels describes the funding effect, which is the coined term for the increase in likelihood that the study results will be favorable if the researchers are hired by a firm with financial interest in the outcome. He further erodes the trust by describing how, in each of the 3 steps in a typical clinical trial, researchers can set things up to 'hugely increase' the chance to get good results or to look better than they are. Michael's lists (pp 149-150) some of the most widely used tricks, which I will list verbatim so we as future peer-reviewers and current consumers can be aware:
1. Test your drug against a treatment that either does not work or does not work very well
2. Test your drug against too low a dose of the comparison drug because this will make your drug appear more effective
3. Test your drug against too high a dose of the comparison drug because this will make your drug appear less toxic
4. publish the results of a single multi center trial many times because this will suggest that multiple studies reached the same conclusions
5. Publish only that part of a trial that favors your drug and bury the rest
6. Fund many clinical trials but publish only those that make your product look good
One example the author used to illustrate some of these tricks is Vioxx, a drug made by Mere k and Co. In the race to find a new drug that could address pain and inflammation without GI side effects (like aspirin and naproxen) Celebrex and Vioxx were created. Michaels chronicles a 4 year history with Vioxx ending in millions of patients being prescribed a drug they didn't need and thousands of heart attacks that were completely avoidable. Another example used was that of phenylpropanolamine (PPA), which was linked to hemorrhagic stroke and took 30 years before the FDA to cancel it.
A small ray of hope enters the chapter when Michaels informs the reader that the FDA is not clueless to these tactics. The agency does request raw data from the companies and has it's own scientists to re-do the work. It also is aware that certain scholarly journals do not live up to their name, and do not publish sound science. Unfortunately, it seems, the FDA does not have the time or finances to re-conduct trials for every new and old drug (post-marketed). With the inclusion of new funding and regulations due to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research the FDA is able to get more speedy approval for new drugs, but has less time (and money) to focus on testing the drugs already in use. Even an independent study of the FDA related to postmarked drugs done by the Institutes of Medicine (IOM) noted that major changes needed to fix the FDA's system for safety of drugs already on the market. Currently, the FDA relies on databases of information from managed care organizations and for companies to do their own postmarked studies- with no major recourse if companies neglect to do so.
In summary, paragraphs 1b and 2 from page 159 leave us with an indication of the state of our nation's drug safety:
"In April 2004 Dr. Drummond Rennie, deputy editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) said, 'this is all about bypassing science. Medicine is becoming a sort of Cloud Cuckoo Land, where doctors doesn't know what papers they can trust in the journals, and the public doesn't know what to believe."
"The bottom line is that the sum total of all of the clinical trials in any given category generally to not tell doctors and patients which drugs are the best." This is... "the whole point of the system, but as it stands now, no one- certainly not the prescribing doctors, perhaps not even the researchers or the FDA- may know if there are even significant difference in efficacy and safety of our drugs prescribed for the same condition."
Related Material:
- Click here it watch a clip related to Vioxx by a FDA lawyer
- Interested in MEREK and Co. commitment to Corporate Responsibility?
- FDA approval process for a new prescription drug
- What does the FDA say about running clinical trials?
- Testimony, which includes key recommendations to prevent future 'vioxx like problems', given to the Joint Finance Committee in 2004 by Bruce M. Psaty, MD, PhD
- What changes could be made to the current FDA approval process to better ensure drug safety and cut down on the duplication of drugs?
- Who (individuals or groups) or what is preventing these changes from being made within the FDA?
- Are the drug companies, like Merek and Co., attending to the issues related to adherence to the scientific method and accuracy and transparency of data with research? If so, how?
- What recourse, if any, are medical institutions and healthcare providers taking to ensure they are getting accurate information and prescribing safe medications to consumers?
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
Chapter 2: Workplace Cancer Before OSHA
An advertisement celebrating the 200th anniversary of the DuPont company reads, "Where do you find a 200-year-old company?" When you flip to the inside of the ad it says, "Everywhere." On the following page it states, "You don't get to be a 200-yr-old company by keeping up with the times. You do it by staying ahead of them. We listen to our customers and the market. And then we look to science for the answers." Further down it reads, "We're more than excited about what lies ahead. But of course, when it comes to the future, we have an advantage. We've been making it for 200 years now."
Anyone who has read Michaels' book Doubt is Their Product will find the statments in the advertisement chilling. The connection between industry and government and the laws that regulate the products and chemicals that can be used in the workplace is latent to the public, just like the symbolism of the DuPont advertisement. However it doesn't take much digging before one can see the blatant relationship between the three sectors and then understand that the ad communicates an ominous tone. Chapter 2 of Michaels' book discusses the DuPont company's role in the dye industry and bladder cancer. After WWI, the U.S. seized top secret formulas for creating synthetic dyes; a market that had been dominated by England, Germany and Switzerland since 1856 when the first dye, mauveine, was discovered by a British chemistry student, William Henry Perkin. The first cases of cancer in connection to dye workers were reported as early as 1895 and a report was generated by the International Labour Organization in 1921 stating the chemicals most likely responsible for the cancer cases were used by the dye factories. However, DuPont allowed its workers to be exposed to the substances even though they were aware of the dangers. In 1934, a toxicologist visited the DuPont dye factory to further understand why cases of the rare bladder cancer were popping up in DuPont workers. He was surprised to find the factory spotless but then discovered the factory had been cleaned for his visit. The toxicologist demanded to see another building and then discovered how the workers were being exposed--the benzidine powder was everywhere. He was fired never allowed back to examine the factories again. It wasn't until 1967, after 450 workers had delveloped bladder cancer, that the exposure to dangerous chemicals at DuPont stopped. However, this company still operated with employees who were dangerously exposed to harmful chemicals. DuPont manufactured organic lead for gasoline well into the 80's, covering up the 300 workers who had been poisoned by lead and the neurological effects experienced by workers who worked in the "House of Butterflies." The connection between DuPont and General Motors (which DuPont had a part-ownership in in the 20's) is no secret.
While DuPont may have been able to continue their operations with other endeavors, dangerous to their employees or not, the companies who created products using asbestos did not. Asbestos, a heat and flame retardant mineral/material, is responsible for 100,000 deaths per year. The companies who generated products containing asbestos kept the information they knew about asbestos exposure and cancer from the public for 70 years. The information of the dangers of asbestos exposure had been around long before asbestos companies went bankrupt paying out damages to disease victims. It was known in Roman times that working with asbestos affected breathing! However, asbestos was used to make thousands of products and the companies that made the products were financially successful. The cover-up of the affects on factory workers was easier than finding a new product to make or a more expensive asbestos replacement. In the 30's, the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) investigated three asbestos textile plants in NC. Strangely, before the investigators showed up, 1/4 of the workforce had been fired--particularly those who had worked at the companies the longest. Despite the industries attempts, the PHS still determined the exposure levels were too high, designating the exposure level to 5 million particles per cubic foot (mppcf). Yet, the PHS had no authority to enforce the standard. At the end of the 40's, Brown, a counsel for Johns-Manville (asbestos co.), stated in a speech that he "[questioned] whether there exists sufficient data correlating the disease to the degree of exposure to warrant any determination taht will even approximate accuracy." AKA creating uncertainty. The industry never conducted studies on exposure levels so that it purposefuly wouldn't be held to a standard.
The asbestos cover-up continued until 1964 when Dr. Irving Selikoff presented the Conference on the Biological Effects of Asbestos. Even after the historic conference, the asbestos companies tried to silence Selikoff. The industry did not succeed. They then turned their attention to blaming Big Tobacco.
With all the evidence of cover-up and creation of uncertainty, why do you think government didn't step in?
With companies abilities to re-locate their factories to other countries for cheaper labor today, how do we ensure the same regulations concerning harmful chemical exposures are followed?
How do we as public health agents make sure that when reports indicate a connection between a chemical and a disease that industry doesn't have the opportunity to create uncertainty?
How do we make sure that the scientific research conducted is sponsored and paid for by a source not related to industry? Is it ethical to accept money from industry for scientific research?
Anyone who has read Michaels' book Doubt is Their Product will find the statments in the advertisement chilling. The connection between industry and government and the laws that regulate the products and chemicals that can be used in the workplace is latent to the public, just like the symbolism of the DuPont advertisement. However it doesn't take much digging before one can see the blatant relationship between the three sectors and then understand that the ad communicates an ominous tone. Chapter 2 of Michaels' book discusses the DuPont company's role in the dye industry and bladder cancer. After WWI, the U.S. seized top secret formulas for creating synthetic dyes; a market that had been dominated by England, Germany and Switzerland since 1856 when the first dye, mauveine, was discovered by a British chemistry student, William Henry Perkin. The first cases of cancer in connection to dye workers were reported as early as 1895 and a report was generated by the International Labour Organization in 1921 stating the chemicals most likely responsible for the cancer cases were used by the dye factories. However, DuPont allowed its workers to be exposed to the substances even though they were aware of the dangers. In 1934, a toxicologist visited the DuPont dye factory to further understand why cases of the rare bladder cancer were popping up in DuPont workers. He was surprised to find the factory spotless but then discovered the factory had been cleaned for his visit. The toxicologist demanded to see another building and then discovered how the workers were being exposed--the benzidine powder was everywhere. He was fired never allowed back to examine the factories again. It wasn't until 1967, after 450 workers had delveloped bladder cancer, that the exposure to dangerous chemicals at DuPont stopped. However, this company still operated with employees who were dangerously exposed to harmful chemicals. DuPont manufactured organic lead for gasoline well into the 80's, covering up the 300 workers who had been poisoned by lead and the neurological effects experienced by workers who worked in the "House of Butterflies." The connection between DuPont and General Motors (which DuPont had a part-ownership in in the 20's) is no secret.
While DuPont may have been able to continue their operations with other endeavors, dangerous to their employees or not, the companies who created products using asbestos did not. Asbestos, a heat and flame retardant mineral/material, is responsible for 100,000 deaths per year. The companies who generated products containing asbestos kept the information they knew about asbestos exposure and cancer from the public for 70 years. The information of the dangers of asbestos exposure had been around long before asbestos companies went bankrupt paying out damages to disease victims. It was known in Roman times that working with asbestos affected breathing! However, asbestos was used to make thousands of products and the companies that made the products were financially successful. The cover-up of the affects on factory workers was easier than finding a new product to make or a more expensive asbestos replacement. In the 30's, the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) investigated three asbestos textile plants in NC. Strangely, before the investigators showed up, 1/4 of the workforce had been fired--particularly those who had worked at the companies the longest. Despite the industries attempts, the PHS still determined the exposure levels were too high, designating the exposure level to 5 million particles per cubic foot (mppcf). Yet, the PHS had no authority to enforce the standard. At the end of the 40's, Brown, a counsel for Johns-Manville (asbestos co.), stated in a speech that he "[questioned] whether there exists sufficient data correlating the disease to the degree of exposure to warrant any determination taht will even approximate accuracy." AKA creating uncertainty. The industry never conducted studies on exposure levels so that it purposefuly wouldn't be held to a standard.
The asbestos cover-up continued until 1964 when Dr. Irving Selikoff presented the Conference on the Biological Effects of Asbestos. Even after the historic conference, the asbestos companies tried to silence Selikoff. The industry did not succeed. They then turned their attention to blaming Big Tobacco.
With all the evidence of cover-up and creation of uncertainty, why do you think government didn't step in?
With companies abilities to re-locate their factories to other countries for cheaper labor today, how do we ensure the same regulations concerning harmful chemical exposures are followed?
How do we as public health agents make sure that when reports indicate a connection between a chemical and a disease that industry doesn't have the opportunity to create uncertainty?
How do we make sure that the scientific research conducted is sponsored and paid for by a source not related to industry? Is it ethical to accept money from industry for scientific research?
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Chapter 14 The Institutionalization of Uncertainty
To intiate the tone of this chapter, I would liek to start with a quote from Micahels,"This idea is to 'institutionalize' the strategies I have been writing about-to construct bureaucratic mechanisms with which corporate interests can question the science underlying not just regulation but virtually any "information" disseminated by federal agencies as well. This would be the very triumph of uncertainty."
What this chapter thrives upon is the industry creating uncertainty in research, data, test results, etc. With uncertainty creation, came the Shelby Ammendment. The Shelby Ammendment was created as an open invitation for ANYONE to use the Freedom of Information Act to "harass scientists, question their work, muddy the waters, delay action, and perhaps even steal intellectual property". Privately funded research is not covered. There was a hidden agenda to this, however. According to the Shelby Ammendment, industry should be free to manipulate the data of government-funded work, but federal agencies and other groups should not be able to analyze industry-sponsored research submitted to the agencies during the regulatory process. So......Freedom of Information Act? Or Freedom for Industry Act? Did the Shelby Ammendment let anyone's voice be heard, or industries?
Do you think this was the only success for industry? WRONG. The Data Quality Act (DQA) became a useful new weapon in the arsenal of all those who opposed public health and workplace regulations, and serious science. Furthermore, Philip Morris was a driving force behind the DQA, of of the several successes of the cigarette manufacturer's "Sound Science Project". This act was enabled with ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information and to establish procedures that allow formal challenges to information disseminated by federal agencies. i don't know about you, but I see the word CHALLENGE. How can industry, especially Big Tobacco, challenge us and we can't challenge them? Why do we have to play by the rules? Why can't we make the rules?
Also, the Data Quality Act was known as the "junk science" movement, the law would simply stop the 'junk science' that can lead to useless and expensive regulations. Excuse me? Useless and expensive regulations? I don't know about you, but I beleive that the unsaid idea here is to STOP all regulatory science initiatives and virtually ALL regulations to give industry control. This shows that the potential for mischief by the DQA is practically unlimited!!!
As you can see, industry's goal has always been to stall and, hopefully, stop agencies attempts to actually issue regulations that protect the environment and public health. Such as, trying to eliminate EPA's current procedures of review of products and industry. Industry has said that if they changes current procedures it would be, "redundant, costly, wasteful of time, and worst of all, duplicitous". Why would they want that? So they can keep telling society what they want them to hear....no surprise...right?
But, it gets better! Oh yes! Industry warned that the new proposal for peer reviews as drafted would mainly lead to increased costs and delays in disseminating information to the public and in hinder health, safety, environmental, and other regulations whilw potentailly damaging the existing systme of peer review. So they are on our side? So they want to keep the same system because it works? NO........they want to keep it this way since it's already manipulated by them to their benefit!
Bottom Line: Industry thinks of themselves, creates lies, and manipulated processes and people to their advantage. How did that happen? How was the involvement of Big Tobacco with the creation of the Data quality Act overlooked in the beginning, but now is well-recognized? Interesting..........................
What this chapter thrives upon is the industry creating uncertainty in research, data, test results, etc. With uncertainty creation, came the Shelby Ammendment. The Shelby Ammendment was created as an open invitation for ANYONE to use the Freedom of Information Act to "harass scientists, question their work, muddy the waters, delay action, and perhaps even steal intellectual property". Privately funded research is not covered. There was a hidden agenda to this, however. According to the Shelby Ammendment, industry should be free to manipulate the data of government-funded work, but federal agencies and other groups should not be able to analyze industry-sponsored research submitted to the agencies during the regulatory process. So......Freedom of Information Act? Or Freedom for Industry Act? Did the Shelby Ammendment let anyone's voice be heard, or industries?
Do you think this was the only success for industry? WRONG. The Data Quality Act (DQA) became a useful new weapon in the arsenal of all those who opposed public health and workplace regulations, and serious science. Furthermore, Philip Morris was a driving force behind the DQA, of of the several successes of the cigarette manufacturer's "Sound Science Project". This act was enabled with ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information and to establish procedures that allow formal challenges to information disseminated by federal agencies. i don't know about you, but I see the word CHALLENGE. How can industry, especially Big Tobacco, challenge us and we can't challenge them? Why do we have to play by the rules? Why can't we make the rules?
Also, the Data Quality Act was known as the "junk science" movement, the law would simply stop the 'junk science' that can lead to useless and expensive regulations. Excuse me? Useless and expensive regulations? I don't know about you, but I beleive that the unsaid idea here is to STOP all regulatory science initiatives and virtually ALL regulations to give industry control. This shows that the potential for mischief by the DQA is practically unlimited!!!
As you can see, industry's goal has always been to stall and, hopefully, stop agencies attempts to actually issue regulations that protect the environment and public health. Such as, trying to eliminate EPA's current procedures of review of products and industry. Industry has said that if they changes current procedures it would be, "redundant, costly, wasteful of time, and worst of all, duplicitous". Why would they want that? So they can keep telling society what they want them to hear....no surprise...right?
But, it gets better! Oh yes! Industry warned that the new proposal for peer reviews as drafted would mainly lead to increased costs and delays in disseminating information to the public and in hinder health, safety, environmental, and other regulations whilw potentailly damaging the existing systme of peer review. So they are on our side? So they want to keep the same system because it works? NO........they want to keep it this way since it's already manipulated by them to their benefit!
Bottom Line: Industry thinks of themselves, creates lies, and manipulated processes and people to their advantage. How did that happen? How was the involvement of Big Tobacco with the creation of the Data quality Act overlooked in the beginning, but now is well-recognized? Interesting..........................
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Are we so smart ?
I do not like smelling of exhausts because it makes me dizzy and stifling. I know a little bit of the hazard of exhausts from auto which tends to be more pertaining to environment pollution, such as increasing exhaust of CO2, SO2, and so on. After I learned physical harm about lead from chapter 4th, “Why Our Children Are Smarter Than We Are” (In David Michaels book entitled, Doubt Is Their Product, 2008). The first example was a typical event, conflicting between paint companies which produced lead-based paints and government policy. According to early twentieth century, some foreseeing experts proofed those children who were exposures to contaminated household dust or ate relatively dose paint chips would occur physical or mental diseases.
As an old Chinese phrase narrates those company that “不是什么省油的灯 (they would not just give up from fighting back)”, those paints company rejected claims and defended their products from attention raised by articles in the JAMA and the American Journal of Disease in Children in public. In the end, the top dog showed up and those paint companies were dealt with by restricted the lead content in paint used in housing built with federal money in the Lead- Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (1971, 1973-1975). Even the old house which existed before the law enacted were required to rebuilt.
Don’t worry, everything’s under control. But does it real all difficulties are being dealt with? Industries always can earn money from environment, people, and countries. “Ethyl” is what we commonly know, actually mean a tetraethyl lead used in gasoline. It kills workers who work with raw oil and refinery of gasoline. Previously, Du Point and GM forced Bureau of Mines to conduct a study on “leaded gasoline was a good idea” and run to manufacture immediately before the New York Times revealed “the insane workers were reduced by ethyl gas” in 1924.
The industries were a prefect schemer. They could deal with every bomb threw by media, people and governments. They (alliance of gasoline industries and Bureau of Mines) denied car exhaust would poison people, concealing scandal by”a clean bill of health”. They did their best to eliminate attention of public in the workers who poisoned by manufacturing gasoline but the car exhausts. Anyway, they succeed in 1960s. Gasoline consumption were keeping high rate, nevertheless, “Silent Spring” as a nightmare coming to those greedy schemer’s dreams. Clair Cameron Patterson, who was a geochemist with his colleague, announced that lead which industrial used had presented in the polar ice cap. Clair Cameron Patterson had not stop researching on lead poison since 1940s. In addition, He devised the uranium-lead dating method into lead-lead dating, and by using lead isotopic data from the Canyon Diablo meteorite and implicated that lead had been a serious environmental and human being’s prisoner. The righteously scientific conclusion persuaded media and government to have advanced research and legislations on lead using. No matter how fabulous these schemers (gasoline industries) did for conceal their wrong.
Relevant policies and organizations recognize lead using in special groups of people (the EPA and the Food and Drug Administration recommended pregnant women, nursing mothers, and young children avoid certain fish), identify lead as a poison and containment in society (the Clean Air Act signed by President Nixon), restrict using of lead and ban the use of lead in gasoline (EPA proposed, the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, outlawed leaded gas in the United States as of Dec 31nd, 1995). Lots of researches (CDC and experts) methodologically evaluate emissions and control equipment is for the development of new pollutant source performance standards. The Aerometric and Emissions Reporting System is comprised of input forms, files, programs and reports. Dr. Herbert Needleman also claimed the connection of lead exposure and lower IQ children and lower blood level in youth.
From 1976 to 1991, lead essentially disappeared from gasoline. Does it really disappear? How did it happen for those schemers? How do these chemical procedures happen in raw oil refine industries? What is index of lead in gasoline safety for the whole world? The environment is shared with human being. The polar is our polar, who can fix it up? Are the new generation who born after 90 s’ smarter than 70s’ for this only this reason? The industries have been perishing for over 100 years. We are using the mask and thank for industrial contribution of convenience in life. Fixing up after using out is very stupid action which we are keeping on. The Copenhagen Climate Conference failed in compromise which appeared “we are smarter than the older generation”…
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